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THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY OF A
JUVENILE'S RIGHT TO BAIL IN JUVENILE
PREADJUDICATION PROCEEDINGS
By Allene K. Richardson Hill*
During the past ten years the right to bail within the juvenile
court system has become an increasingly controversial issue.' Under-
lying this controversy are complex issues and problems involving the
original goals of the juvenile court system, and the constitutional
questions over due process in juvenile proceedings and the right to
bail itself. This note will consider whether in the light of these com-
plexities the due process requirement of fundamental fairness de-
mands the imposition of -the right to bail in juvenile preadjudication
procedures.
Issues concerning a detained juvenile's constitutional right to bail
are inextricably tied to the general controversy of whether the Eighth
Amendment grants the right to bail. Initially, the Eighth Amendment
speaks not in terms of the right to bail, but rather that "excessive bail
shall not be required." Since federal law has always provided for a
right to bail,2 the Supreme Court has never reached the constitutional
question of whether the Eighth Amendment implicitly grants the
right to bail.
Absent a Supreme Court decision, the ambiguous language of
the excessive bail clause lends itself to at least three interpretations,
and a number of controversies.' First, in a number of state criminal
* A.B., 1970, Boston University. J.D., 1974, University of California, Hastings
College of the Law.
1. See cases cited notes 111-139 and accompanying text infra, and also Kinney
v. Lenon, 447 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1971).
2. The first provision was in the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat.
73, 91. It is presently contained in FED. R. Cmm. P. 46(a)(1).
3. Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail 1, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 959,
969-70 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Foote 1]; See also Foote, The Coming Constitu-
tional Crisis in Bail 11, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1125 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Foote
11]. Both articles present a thorough discussion on the constitutional problems in-
volved with the subject of bail. Foote I discusses the historic background of the right
to bail and the excessive bail clause. Foote II considers the due process and equal
protection issues created by the monetary basis of the system and the indigent defend-
ant.
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cases, it has been held that "excessive bail" language, in itself, does not
establish a right to bail.4 A second group of cases, on the other hand,
suggest that such a clause infers that bail cannot be excessive in amount
in cases where the court sets bail. 5 However, if there are no statutory
provisions or restrictions, the court has the discretion to deny bail alto-
gether. 6  A third group holds or suggests that the excessive bail
clause necessarily implies a constitutional right to bail. 7  A problem
with this last approach, as pointed out by Professor Caleb Foote, is
that the precise scope of the implied right is relatively undefined and
this creates yet another issue.8 Until these inconsistencies concerning
the interpretations of the excessive bail clause are settled, the language
of the Eighth Amendment lends little support for the argument that
juveniles should be granted the right to bail.
Criminal Procedure Applied to Juvenile Adjudications
While a number of state constitutions explicitly grant the right
to bail,9 these provisions offer little support for the argument that this-
right should be extended to include juveniles. First, as will be dis-
cussed later, children may be treated differently from adults. The
juvenile court at its inception was devised to treat children's misdeeds
differently from adult crimes. As a result, the juvenile court system
was permitted to maintain procedures distinct from criminal court.10
Although the right to bail was granted in adult cases, prior to the
Gault decision, bail was traditionally denied to juveniles based on this
distinction." Furthermore, the state has the power to deny the right
to bail unless the denial is irrational, unreasonable, or arbitrary.'12
Because the Supreme Court has been reluctant to deal with the con-
4. See, e.g., People v. Holder, 70 Misc. 2d 819, 335 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1972), Peo-
ple ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prison, 290 N.Y. 393, 49 N.E.2d 498, 39 N.Y.S.2d
526 (1943) (excessive bail clause of N.Y. Const.); Vanderford v. Brand, 126 Ga. 67,
54 S.E. 822 (1906) (dictum) (excessive bail clause of Ga. Const.).
5. See, e.g., Reddy v. Snepp, 357 F. Supp. 999 (D.N.C. 1973), Ex parte Voll,
41 Cal. 29 (1871) (excessive bail language does not imply post-conviction bail).
6. Id.
7. Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960) (a pre-Gault juvenile deci-
sion holding a general absolute right to bail in non-capital cases); see Mastrian v. Hed-
man, 326 F.2d 708 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965 (1964) (by implica-
tion).
8. Foote I, supra note 3, at 970.
9. COLUm UNivnEsrry, LEGISLATVE DRAMrING RESEARCH Ftun, INDEx Dr-
GEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 26 (1959).
10. See text accompanying notes 16 and 17 infra.
11. See, e.g., Ex parte Cromwell, 232 Md. 305, 192 A.2d 775 (1963), Cinque
v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 A. 678 (1923).
12. Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
965 (1964).
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stitutionality of a separate and distinct juvenile court,1 3 and has also
been hesitant to abet the demise of the juvenile court system,' 4 there is
little substance to an argument that there are no distinctions between
adults and juveniles rendering the state's denial of bail arbitrary, un-
reasonable, or discriminatory.
The juvenile court is a phenomenon of the early twentieth cen-
tury. Prior to the initiation of the various juvenile court acts, juven-
iles who had reached the age of culpability 5 and had been accused of
criminal conduct, were entitled to the procedures of and subject to
the same criminal court as adults.' 6 With the advent of the juvenile
court acts, children became subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
juvenile court.' 7  The goals of the juvenile court system were the wel-
fare and best interests of the child rather than punishment per se.' 8
Theoretically distinguishing the juvenile court from the criminal court,
the reformers reasoned that the procedures of the criminal court were
not necessary in the juvenile system.19 Indeed, these protective pro-
cedures were viewed as obstacles to the achievement of the juvenile
13. Examples are the delicacy of the Court's tread in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
13, 17 (1967) and Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 551-52 (1966).
14. See text accompanying note 52 infra.
15. "inhere is a presumption of criminal incapacity on the part of an infant
below the age of fourteen, which is conclusive prior to the age of seven and rebuttable
thereafter. In other words, while it is otherwise in the case of one under the age of
seven, the common law recognizes the possibility of criminal guilt by a person between
the ages of seven and fourteen if the individual is shown to have sufficient maturity
as a matter of fact despite the lack of years." R. P, xINs, CRIMINAL. Lw 839 (2d
ed. 1969).
16. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HAnv. L. RV. 104, 106 (1909) [hereinafter
cited as Mack]. This work considers the juvenile system at the time of its inception.
17. See, Mack, supra note 16, at 109. Illinois' Act of 1898 was the first juvenile
court law. Van Waters, The Socialization of Juvenile Court Procedure, 13 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S, 61, 63 (1922) [hereinafter cited as Van Waters].
18. "In theory this court is parental, a court of guardianship, not a criminal or
quasi-criminal court, but a court where the paramount issue is the welfare of the child."
Van Waters, supra note 17, at 63. Another early expression: "To save children from
life-long consequences of childish errors, to check their feet at the very entrance of
the downward road and to set them upon the gently graded pathway leading to useful-
ness and happiness, to let them expiate a fault at their own homes under the surveil-
lance of kindly probation officers, and to accomplish those ends without the publicity
that tends to blast later attempts at well-doing, as well as to save young souls from
the taint of contact with matured criminals, these were the purposes sought to be ac-
complished in establishment of the juvenile court of Buffalo." Murphy, New York-
History of the Juvenile Court of Buffalo, in THm INTERNkAToNAL PRISON COMMISSION,
CrmDREN's COuRTS IN THE UNrTED STATES 10 (1904). But cf. Fox, Juvenile Justice
,Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. Rv. 1187 (1970). The concern for
the child's welfare was only one of many paradoxical elements motivating juvenile jus-
tice reform.
19. Mack, supra note 16, at 109-110, and Van Waters, supra note 17, at 64-65.
Spring 1974]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
court goals.20  As a result, it was believed that to approximate the
goals of the system, informal, individualized, paternal, and solicitous
procedures were the most appropriate. 21
Unfortunately, informal procedures tended to be subject to abuse.
When describing prejudicial dispositions in the juvenile court, the
President's Commission of Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice 22 found that:
Discretion too often is exercised haphazardly and episodically,
without the salutary obligation to account and without a founda-
tion in full and comprehensive information about the offender and
about the availability and likelihood of alternative dispositions.
Opportunities occur for illegal and even discriminatory results, for
abuse of authority by the iU-intentioned, the prejudiced, the over-
zealous. Irrelevant, improper considerations-race, nonconform-
ity, punitiveness, sentimentality, understaffing, overburdening loads
-may govern officials in their largely personal exercise of discre-
tion.23
The failure of informality to serve the best interest and welfare
of the child was recognized by the Supreme Court in the late sixties.
In three decisions, Kent v. United States,2" In re Gault,25 and In re
Winship,26 the Supreme Court noted that due to this failure and the
resulting injustice to the juvenile, due process required procedural
formalities in the juvenile court proceedings.
In the Kent decision, the Court dealt with the informal pro-
ceedings in which the juvenile court waived jurisdiction of a minor
and transferred him to criminal court. The Court held that a hearing
to consider waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction is required. This
waiver hearing was necessary considering the significance of the ju-
venile court's order.27  Justice Fortas, speaking for the majority, de-
clared:
20. See Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile
Cases, 1966 Sup. Cr. R.vmw 167, 171, 174 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Paulsen).
This article provides a full discussion of the juvenile system in retrospect prior to the
Gault decision. For a complete description of the structure and assumptions of the
juvenile court, see Pound, The Juvenile Court and the Law (1944) in 10 CaME &
DELINQUENCY 490 (1964).
21. Paulsen, supra note 20, at 169-72, and Mack, supra note 16 at 109-111.
22. THE PRESIDNTrs COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENoB OF CRIME IN A FRE Socxw (1968) [hereinafter cited as
CHALLENGE]. The purpose of this commission was to report about crime in America,
"about those who commit it, about those who are its victims, and about what can be
done to reduce it." Id. at 37.
23. Id. at 222.
24. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
25. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
26. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
27. In Kent's case, as a result of the waiver order, he was transferred to jail along
[Vol. I
[Tihere is no place in our system of law for reaching a result
of such tremendous consequences without ceremony-without
hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a state-
ment of reasons. It is inconceivable that a court of justice deal-
ing with adults, with respect to a similar issue, would proceed in
this manner. It would be extraordinary if society's special con-
cern for children ...permitted this procedure. We hold that
it does not.28
Thus the Court decided that informal procedures had, in practice,
failed to reflect the special concerns of the reformers. As a result,
the Court held that Kent was entitled to a hearing, including access
by his counsel to the social records and probation reports, and a state-
ment of reasons for the juvenile court's decision. 29 Furthermore, the
Court stated that although the hearing may be informal,30, it must
'measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment." 3'
Because informal procedures had not reflected society's concerns for
the child's welfare, procedural due process required such regularities
as a waiver hearing. The informal proceedings of the hearing, in
which there is a possibility of incarceration and loss of liberty, must
satisfy the essentials of due process and fair treatment.
One year later in the Gault case, the Court dealt with the question
of whether the rights of notice, counsel, privilege against self-incrimin-
ation, and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses were re-
quired by due process at the adjudication of delinquency. Justice
Fortas, writing for the majority, reemphasized the Court's general dis-
satisfaction with the informal procedure of the juvenile courts:
The absence of substantive standards has not necessarily meant
that children receive careful, compassionate, individualized treat-
ment. The absence of procedural rules based upon constitutional
principles has not always produced fair, efficient, and effective
procedures. Departures from established principles of due process
have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbi-
trariness. 32
After stating that the unique and beneficial aspects of the system
would "not compel the States to abandon or displace any of the sub-
stantive benefits of the juvenile process," 3 the Court declared that the
adjudication proceeding must "measure -up to the essentials of due
with adults, and was exposed to the possibility of a death sentence instead of treatment
for a maximum of five years and the protection of the Juvenile Court Act. 383 U.S.
at 553-54 (1966).
28. Id. at 554.
29. Id. at 557.
30. Id. at 561.
31. Id. at 562.
32. 387 U.S. at 18-19.
33. Id. at 21.
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process and fair treatment. '8 4 Following a discussion of the principles
each right reflects, the Court imposed these four rights in the pro-
ceedings.85 The Court was careful to add, however, that the imposi-
tion of these formalities did not imply that the requirements of a
criminal trial or of an administrative hearing were necessary. 36
In the Winship decision, the Court, operating upon the Gault
rationale, imposed an additional formality in the adjudication pro-
ceedings. Due process, the Court declared, required the criminal
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt at delinquency adjudi-
cations.37  Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, noted that the
reasonable doubt standard was a "prime instrument for reducing the
risk of convictions resting on factual error.138  Furthermore, the need
for criminal safeguards in juvenile proceedings was not obviated by
civil labels and good intentions; 39 such safeguards were necessary im-
positions when a child charged with violation of a criminal law could
possibly be subjected to institutional confinement.40 Justice Brennan,
however, was careful to note that such an imposition would not risk
any destruction to the beneficial aspects of the juvenile court.41  The
standard was necessary because a child's best interest was not promoted
if he could be subjected to the stigma of "delinquent" for violating a
criminal law and institutionally confined on proof insufficient to con-
vict him were he an adult. 42
Thus after recognizing the failure of the juvenile court to ap-
proximate the goals of the reformers and its failure to even satisfy the
fundamentals of due process in certain proceedings, the Court imposed
due process regularities on the once totally informal proceedings of
the juvenile court system.
The decision of the Court in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,43 how-
ever, dispelled any beliefs that all procedural requirements of a crim-
inal trial 'would be necessary in juvenile proceedings, when the Court
denied juveniles the right to trial by jury. Justice Blackmun, writing
for the Court, tersely stated that:
34. Id. at 30.
35. Id. at 33 (timely notice), 36-41 (counsel), 45, 47-48 (self-incrimination), 50-
56 (self-incrimination and confessions).
36. Id. at 30.
37. 397 U.S. at 367. The Court first discussed the principle and rationale of the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 361-64.
38. Id. at 363.
39. Id. at 365-66.
40. Id. at 367.
41. Id. at 366.
42. Id. at 367.
43. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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[Tihe applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings,
as developed by Gault and Winship, is fundamental fairness. As
that standard was applied in those two cases, we have an emphasis
on factfinding procedures. The requirements of notice, counsel,
confrontation, cross-examination, and standard of proof naturally
flowed from this emphasis. But one cannot say that in our legal
system the jury is a necessary component of accurate factfinding.44
As such, the right to "trial by jury in the juvenile court's adjudicative
stage is not a constitutional requirement."
45
There are two basic arguments given in the McKeiver decision
supporting the fairness of the juvenile non-jury proceedings and
which militate against the constitutional requirement that the right to
jury trial be imposed in juvenile proceedings.46 The weight of authority
was against such a requirement 47  But more importantly, the benefits
of the juvenile court's ability to function in a unique manner outweighed
the benefits contributed by the jury trial to the fact finding function of
the juvenile proceedings.48
While the decision established that in the balancing process,
the benefits of the juvenile system outweigh the benefits of the jury
trial, the decision has been validly criticized for failing to mention the
policies or values that the Court considered in finding the adjudication
hearing fundamentally fair.49 Furthermore, the Court failed to con-
sider adequately the purpose of the jury trial beyond that of fact-
finding.50 Unlike Gault and Winship, the Court in McKeiver did not
scrutinize the particular juvenile proceedings. 1 Rather, the emphasis
of the decision lies in the assertion that the jury trial would possibly
impede and inhibit any experimentation or flexibility within the sys-
tem,52 and would transform the system into an adversary proceed-
44. Id. at 543.
45. Id. at 545.
46. Comment, Constitutional Law-Due Process: No Constitutional Right to Trial
by Jury for Juveniles in Delinquency Proceedings, 56 MINN. L. REv. 249, 254-55
(1971) [hereinafter cited as MINN.].
47. The Court in McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 544-49, cited the Task Force Report,
Uniform Juvenile Court Act, the Standard Juvenile Court Act, the Legislative Guide
for Drafting Family and Juvenile Court Acts, and its own dictum from Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
48. 403 U.S. at 547.
49. Comment, Juvenile Courts-luveniles in Delinquency Proceedings Are Not
Constitutionally Entitled to the Right to Trial by Jury-McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 70
Mci.L L. RPv. 171, 193 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Micr]; MnNN., supra note 46, at
257. See also Ketcham, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: The Last Word on Juvenile Court
Adjudications? 57 CoRNELL L. REv. 561 (1972).
50. MIN., supra note 46, at 257. See Mlcii., supra note 49, at 193.
51. See MIcH, supra note 49, at 193.
52. 403 U.S. at 545-47, 550. See MIcE, supra note 49, at 188.
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ing.53 Indicative of this emphasis is an early statement by the ma-
jority that "the Court has insisted that these successive decisions do
not spell the doom of the juvenile court system or even deprive it
of its informality, flexibility, or speed."54
The effect of these four decisions has been an accommodation of
the goals and philosophy of the juvenile system within the framework
of the due process standard.5 5 The constitutional requirement of due
process dictates the necessity of some criminal procedures at certain
juvenile proceedings. However, fundamental fairness does not re-
quire that all of these procedures be applied.
The question emerges as to whether or not fundamental fairness
includes a right to bail in juvenile preadjudication proceedings. In
light of the Supreme Court proscriptions thus far issued, the constitu-
tional requirement of due process and fundamental fairness does not
seem to necessitate the imposition of the right to bail at juvenile pread-
judication proceedings.
When considering the application of the right to bail, the balanc-
ing test of the McKeiver decision must be applied as the latest defini-
tive statement by the Supreme Court on juvenile court proceedings.
The McKeiver Court balanced the benefits of the juvenile court's
ability to function against the benefits contributed by the jury trial to
the factfinding function of the juvenile proceeding. -"' Such a bal-
ancing test, if applied to the bail issue, would in effect balance the
benefits of the informal preadjudication proceedings against the bene-
fits contributed from the right to bail to the factfinding function of
the juvenile proceedings.
It is submitted, however, that the balancing process should also
consider the realities of the juvenile proceedings,57 and, in addition,
should not be limited to the factfinding function of the right to jury
trial. Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion to the McKeiver
decision, stated his belief that the juvenile proceedings should be re-
viewed and considered. He declared that the jury question could not
be decided except in terms of the "adequacy of a particular state pro-
cedure to 'protect the [juvenile] from oppression by the government,
and to protect him against 'the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge.' "158
53. 403 U.S. at 545.
54. Id. at 534. The Court cited In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 366.
55. Nothing will be said in this article on the constitutional basis for the juvenile
court system.
56. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
57. The Court had considered such realities of the juvenile proceedings in In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366-67 (1970), In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28-30 (1967), Kent
v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 552-54 (1966). See MIcI, supra note 49, at 193.
58. 403 U.S. at 554 (Brennan, L; concurring).
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Furthermore, the purpose of the particular juvenile proceedings
and the purpose and practical application of the right to be imposed
should also be considered.59 Only after considering both the realities
and the purposes can a balancing 'be made that will approximate the
goals of the juvenile court and be consistent with the Court's em-
phasis that the procedure not lead to the demise of the system.60
Balancing the Juvenile System with the Right to Bail
In juvenile preadjudication proceedings, the child has initially
been taken into custody and is awaiting a hearing or orders as to his
conduct. In all states the child is brought before a juvenile court
official who may decide if the child should be detained for his own
good or released to the custody of his parents or guardians pending
the disposition of his case.6 The informality is deemed beneficial
because it affords the judge the opportunity to consider the child's
needs and welfare.62
Originally, detention of the juvenile and separation from his fam-
ily was to be avoided as much as possible.6 3  The early reformers
deemed detention proper only when the child's welfare required cus-
tody, as in circumstances where no responsible adult was willing or
able to take the child.64 In practice, however, the discretionary power
to detain has been used widely. The Task Force on Juvenile De-
linquency and Youth Crime 5 found that "detention of children ap-
pears to be far too routinely and frequently used."6 6 Nearly three-
quarters of the delinquent juveniles referred to probation departments
by law enforcement agencies were held in juvenile halls. 67  In some
communities, however, the task force found that the ratio was even
higher.
59. See notes 35, 37 and accompanying text supra; McH, supra note 49, at 183,
193; MIN, supra note 46, at 257, 259.
60. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
61. See Comment, The Right to Bail and the Pre-"Trial" Detention of luveniles
Accused of "Crime", 18 VAND. L. REV. 2096, 2101-04 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Right
to Bail. This article gives a complete analysis of all the juvenile court acts on this
procedure. Id. at 2098-99.
62. PprsWmmr's COMmiSSION oN LAW ENFORCEMNT AND ADmiSTRATION oF
JusTicE, TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YoUTH CRIME 16 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE].
63. See Mack, supra note 16, at 116.
64. Id.
65. The purpose of the Task Force was to "inquire into the working of the ex-
isting system of juvenile justice and suggest methods of improving it." TAsK FORCE,
supra note 62, at XL
66. Id. at 36.
67. Id.
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[V]irtually every juvenile referred by law enforcement officers
to the probation department was detained, notwithstanding the
fact that some minors were apprehended in error, many committed
inconsequential offenses, and many others had responsible parents
able to control the minor pending juvenile court appearance. 68
Other researchers have found that the large breadth of discretion
accorded to police results in varying rates of detention. Some dis-
tricts have detained all children referred to juvenile court, while others
have held only two or three out of every one hundred. 9
A 50% ratio is not uncommon, although the National Council on
Crime and Delinquency estimates that only 10% of the children
apprehended for delinquency are in need of official custody pend-
ing adjudication or disposition of their cases.70
Records also reveal that forty-three percent of the children detained
overnight or longer are eventually released without ever being brought
before a juvenile court judge;71 half .of all cases referred to juvenile
courts are resolved at the intake stage before any judicial hearing.72
This unnecessary detention is even less tolerable in light of evi-
dence that detention facilities are overcrowded and inadequate. In
a study conducted in California counties, "the proportion of children
detained daily in excess of designed capacity on the average ranged
from approximately 10 percent to 100 percent."73  Thirteen of the
twenty largest counties studied in California had insufficient bed
space, causing one of the major problems in their juvenile halls.74
In Minnesota a detention center with a thirty-bed capacity transferred
an excess of one thousand juveniles to jail each year.h Furthermore,
while many states forbid the jailing of children with adults, nearly
ninety percent of all juvenile court jurisdictions are too small to war-
rant separate facilities for the juveniles.70 As a result "children are
detained in old-age homes, insane asylums, courthouses, or often in
one or two cells of the local jails set aside as 'detention quarters.' ,,77
Such evidence supports the argument that release is imperative ex-
cept in those limited circumstances in which there is no other alter-
native.
68. Id.
69. D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN Tub UNITED STATES: (1964), at 97 [hereinafter
cited as FREED & WALD].
70. Id.
71. Id. at 100.
72. Id.
73., THE GOvERNoR's SPECIAL STUDY COMMISSION ON JUVENIlE JUSTICE, PART II,
A STUDY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNi 82 (1960).
74. Id.
75. FREED & WALD, supra note 69, at 107.
76. Id. at 105.
77. Id.
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As a result of the unnecessary detention and the inadequate de-
tention facilities, critics of the proceedings have advocated that the
right to bail as a remedy for this abuse is constitutionally required by
fundamental fairness.78 Such a right, it is alleged, would remedy this
improper detention.
Bail developed as a system for providing a means of releasing
the accused while at the same time providing some assurance that he
would appear at trial. 79 In its present day form of commercial
bonding, involving the cash-bond and bail-bondsmen system, the bail
system has been subjected to a number of criticisms concerning its
practical application."0  Not only has the monetary basis of the bail
system been criticized, but the application of such a system has raised
constitutional questions."1
The monetary basis of the bail system has permitted bail to be
used to detain people for reasons other than to assure their presence
at trial."2 In 1963 the Judiciary Committee of the New York State
78. Prior to the Gault decision, two cases granted juveniles the right to bail based
on the argument that the purpose of juvenile court acts is to provide additional benefits
for the juvenile, and not to remove those rights which he had previously possessed.
Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960); State v. Franklin, 202 La. 439,
12 So. 2d 211 (1943), followed without comment in State v. Hundley, 263 La. 94,
267 So. 2d 207 (1972). Following Gault three cases have granted the right to bail.
Clark v. Noble (D.C. Miss. 1968), reported in 1 Pov. L. REP. § 4130.501 (1972),
based its decision on the argument that in a juvenile hearing a child was entitled to
all the constitutional rights of an adult Two Wisconsin lower court cases granted the
right to bail based on the Gault decision. Wisconsin ex rel. Mayberry v. Administrator
(Waukesha County Ct. 1967); Wisconsin ex rel. Wronski v. Frohmader, No. 349-590
(Milwaukee Cir. Ct. 1967) cited in Comment, Right to Bail for Juveniles, 48 CM.-
KrNT L. Rev. 99, 101 n.20 (1971). See also Comment, A Juvenile's Right to Bail
In Oregon, 47 ORE. L. Rav. 194 (1968); Comment, Right, to Bail for Juveniles, 48
CH.-KEN L REv. 99 (1971). Written prior to the McKeiver decision, these notes
argue that juvenile proceedings function as criminal proceedings and therefore criminal
safeguards should be imposed. See generally Mora, Juvenile Detention: A Constitu-
tional Problem Affecting Local Government, 1 URB. LAw. 189 (1969); Dorsen & Rez-
neck, In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 FAM. L.Q. 1 (Dec. 1967); Com-
ment, Juvenile Justice and Pre-Adjudication Detention, 1 U.C.L.A.-ALAsKA L. REv. 154
(1972).
79. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951). See also A. GOLDFARB, RANSOM
(1965) [hereinafter cited as GoUDFARB].
80. See Note, An Answer to the Problem of Bail: A Proposal in Need of Em-
pirical Confirmation, 9 CoLum. J. LAW & Soc. PRoB. 394 (1973); Paulsen, Pretrial
Release in the United States, 66 COLUM. L. Rev. 109 (1966) [hereinafter cited- as Pre-
trial Release]; Note, Bail in the United States: A System in Need of Reform, 20 HAST-
INGS L.J 380 (1968). Comment, Tinkering with the California Bail System, 56 CAIUF.
L REv. 1134 (1968). These authorities give a criticism of the bail system and offer
possible alternatives.
81. See Foote I and Foote II, supra note 3.
82. "The bail system is currently used indirectly to detain certain defendants be-
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Assembly cited five areas of abuse.8 First, the committee criticized
the limitation of the bail hearing to facts relating to the alleged offense
or the defendant's criminal record without considering personal fact-
ors of the defendant that would make him a good risk.84 Second,
the committee cited judges who, presuming guilt, use bail to give de-
fendants a "taste for jail" by arbitrarily setting bail beyond the de-
fendant's financial means, resulting in the accused's detention.85 The
committee also found that judges at times used the power to coerce the
defendants in some aspect of the case.86  Fourth, it criticized judicial
reliance on recommendations of the district attorney who had no more
information than the judge. Such a practice, in effect, results in the
abdication of judicial responsibility.87  Lastly, the committee cited
the failure of defense counsel to participate in the bail setting process
and to function as a competent legal representative by appealing to
the arraigning judge for bail leniency.8
A Philadelphia bail study revealed that in two-thirds of the cases
before a particular magistrate, he set bail after considering the de-
fendant's name and the nature of the offense alone." Some magis-
trates candidly admitted that they set high bail to break crime waves,
keep the defendant in jail, protect women, or "make an example" of
a recalcitrant defendantY' Thus, detention is often the result of the
bail system "employed to achieve other aims than the safe production
of accused at the time of trial.... ."91
Most important, however, are the constitutional questions of the
system's relationship to indigents. Indigents often cannot afford even
the minimal standard bail set for the offense, resulting in their con-
tinued incarceration.92 "Compared with other due process problems
which have arisen in recent years, bail presents differences in the
treatment of the poor which are more pervasive and pernicious. 93 As-
fore trial. Judges manipulate the bail system, which on its face does not so provide,
to meet the needs for preventive detention." GoLDFAP,, supra note 79, at 12. See
also Pretrial Release, supra, note 80, F-nn-D & WALD, supra note 69, Foote II, supra
note 3.
83. FREw & WALD, supra, note 69, at 13-15, n.6, citing New York Leg. Doc.
No. 37 (1963).
84. FRnn & WAID, supra note 69, at 13.
85. Id. at 14.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102
U. PA. L. R V. 1031, 1038 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Philadelphia Bail Study].
90. Id. at 1039-40.
91. Pretrial Release, supra note 80, at 114.
92. Philadelphia Bail Study, supra note 89, at 1032-33.
93. Foote I, supra note 3, at 963,
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suming that the excessive bail clause implies the right to bail, the
constitutional problems result from a conflict "between an historically
derived discrimination and a growing thrust towards equal protec-
tion.104 The constitutional issues inherent in the confrontation of the
indigent defendant with the bail system have been enumerated by
Professor Foote.95 He asserts that the indigent defendant is being
denied the fundamental fairness guaranteed by due process of law
when, alleging his own innocence, he is punished by imprisonment
before trial.96  His detention denies him procedural due process: in-
carceration may effectively prevent adequate preparation of his case
and thereby deprive him of a fair trial.97 Denied pretrial liberty solely
on account of his poverty, he is being denied equal protection of the
law.98 The indigent's apparent right to bail under the eighth and
fourteenth amendments is violated when the proscription against "ex-
cessive" bail is construed in such a way as to automatically foreclose
his fundamental right to freedom pending trial.99 These complex
and unsettled constitutional issues which exist in the relationship be-
tween the monetary bail system and the indigent will also be faced by
indigent juveniles if they have a right to bail.
When considering the application of bail to the juvenile system,
the problems become more pervasive. First, an absolute right to bail
is in theory at odds with the traditional philosophy of the juvenile
court; the welfare and protection of the child is at issue rather than
his guilt or innocence. As the task force stated in 1967, "Release
as of right plainly may interfere with the protection or care required
in some cases."'1 0  When describing the juvenile court procedure,
even reformers considered that detention of the child might at times
be necessary if the home was totally unfit for the child.' 01
Another problem created by the bail system for the juvenile lies
in the incapacity of the minor to enter into a contract with a bail
bondsman. The juvenile is under no enforceable duty if the agree-
ment is executory on both sides.' 02 Therefore, the ability of the child
to avoid his contracts by pleading his infancy as a defense' 0 3 will dis-
courage bondsmen to enter into a contract with him. As a result, his
94. Foote I1, supra note 3, at 1126.
95. Id. at 1135.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. TAsK FORCE, supra note 62, at 36.
101. Mack, supra note 16, at 117.
102. 1 A. Com, CoRBiN ON CONTRACTS § 6 (1963).
103. Id.
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right to bail will be contingent on his parent's willingness or ability to
enter into a contract with the bondsman. The Alaska Supreme Court
noted this problem when considering the question of bail and juvenile
proceedings. In the case of Doe v. State, the court asserted that:
[Tlhe present adult bail system would be practically unsuitable
as a device for securing the child's -future appearance before the
court, and would not necessarily result in the child's release. Be-
cause contracts entered into by minors have been held to be void-
able, bail bondsmen surely would be unwilling to deal directly
with a child in providing a bail bond. Unless the child's parents
are willing and financially able to secure the bond, the child's
right to bail will not result in release. 104
As an additional consideration, statistical data reveal that de-
linquents are concentrated disproportionately in the large inner cities
and tend to come from families with lower than average income.105
Thus, a considerable number of juveniles taken into custody will pos-
sibly be confronted with the identical due process and equal protection
complications faced by the adult indigent accused.
The bail system is beset with a number of practical and theo-
retical problems for juveniles as well as adults. Theoretically the
excessive bail clause of the Eighth Amendment does not clearly pro-
vide for a right to bail in all cases.'0 6 In addition, not only does
the system in practice set bail at exorbitant levels and subject it to
abusive use, but the bail system creates a number of constitutional
issues involving indigent defendants and bail's monetary basis.10 7
Evidence shows that abuse and detention are prominent in the adult bail
system.' As such, although the imposition of the right to bail may
allow pre-trial release of the child, the practical application and func-
tioning of the system does not remedy the excessive detention practices
of the informal juvenile proceeding. The imposition of the right, in
its prominent form of commercial bonding, would visit all the prob-
lems associated with bail in the criminal courts and with indigent de-
fendants upon the juvenile; in addition, the voidability of a juvenile's
contract could foreclose bail as a means of release.
From the evidence available, a means of remedying the unneces-
sary detention practices of the juvenile courts is warranted. However,
in light of the problems present in the bail system, the application of
the right to bail does not seem to offer the appropriate procedural
remedy to render the preadjudication proceedings fundamentally fair.
Rather, the juvenile court system itself provides a possible remedy for
104. 487 P.2d 47, 52 (Alas. 1971).
105. CHALLENGE, supra note 22, at 173.
106. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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unnecessary detention. As noted earlier,10 9 release is usually available
at the discretion of a juvenile court official. The flexibility of the
juvenile court system permits improvisation, with the present proce-
dures providing a more satisfactory means of release than offered by
the bail system. As such, the right to bail should not be constitu-
tionally required. A number of lower courts" 0 have realized the
problems of the bail system and have utilized the existing procedure
to correct unnecessary detention. Furthermore, in some cases the
courts have imposed additional requirements to insure that detention
is not a routine practice and is employed only when absolutely neces-
ary.
Courts Consider Bail for Juveniles
In one of the first cases dealing with the right to bail following
the Gault decision, Fulwood v. Stone,"' the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia declined to consider the constitutional right to
bail of juveniles. Fulwood had been confined in the District of Col-
umbia Receiving Home for Children pending trial on charges of rob-
bery and assault.:" 2 From this situation, Fulwood's counsel had re-
quested the minor's release on bail. The trial judge, John Sirica,
denied the request, asking "Who is going to put it up?'" 1 3  The
Court of Appeals, in declining to face the issue, stated that if the
provisions of the Juvenile Court Act of the District of Columbia" 4
were faithfully observed, there would be a more than adequate substitute
for bail." 5 This statute provided that after an officer took a child
into custody, he could release the child to his parents unless other-
wise ordered by the court. Thereafter, if the juvenile court had as-
sumed custody of the child, it could still release the child to a guardian
or parents pending final disposition of the case. The Fulwood court
concluded that "appropriate inquiry" concerning pretrial custody was
a requirement of the juvenile court." 6  Such an inquiry was neces-
sary to comply with the stated statutory intent of Congress that the
child and his family ties be conserved and strengthened, and the child
receive the guidance and care, preferably in his own home, that would
serve his best interests."7 The case was then remanded for further
inquiry.
109. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
110. See notes 111-39 infra.
111. 394 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
112. Id. at 941.
113. Id.
114. D.C. CODE §§ 16-2306, 16-2316 (1966) set out in the opinion, 394 F.2d at 943.
115. 394 F.2d at 943.
116. Id. at 944.
117. D.C. CODE § 16-2316 (1966).
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In the recent case of Baker v. Smith,118 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals found that the juvenile was not entitled to the right to bail.
Smith had been charged with malicious mischief for throwing a
brick through the windshield of a parked automobile."19 The court,
without elaboration, declared that he was not entitled to bail because
there was "ample authority in the juvenile court to release a child from
detention.' 20
In Baldwin v. Lewis,12 ' the court of appeals, as in Fulwood,
did not find it necessary to deal with the constitutional right to bail in
juvenile proceedings. Ia this case Baldwin had been confined on
suspicion of arson, although no reasons for detention had initially
been stated by the police. 12  The next day, the social worker deter-
mined that detention was necessary. However, he failed to indicate
the facts that were the basis for his conclusion that the child was
"almost certain to commit an offense dangerous to himself or the
community before the court disposition .. "..23 Two days later,
the children's court on rehearing affirmed the detention although the
record was barren of facts to provide a basis for this conclusion.
None of the witnesses' statements were in the record, nor were ex-
hibits offered or received in evidence, and no testimony was taken. 24
The Baldwin court's findings that bail was not constitutionally
necessary was premised upon the belief that the Wisconsin Chil-
dren's Code, 2 5 if faithfully observed, would provide an adequate sub-
stitute for bail. 26 Under this statute, the juvenile court was required
to release the juvenile to the custody of his parents unless there is a
finding that they are incapable of caring for him. The court, how-
ever, did not simply leave the faithful observance of the code to the
discretion of the trial court when it must determine the detention or
release of a child. In such a detention inquiry, to comply with fund-
amental fairness, the court required a judicial determination of prob-
able cause; facts or documents upon which the decision for detention
was based had to be identified, made part of the record, or made avail-
able to counsel for inspection.' 2 7  Furthermore, an adequate record
118. 477 S.W.2d 149 (Ky. 1972).
119. Id. at 150.
120. Id. at 152.
121. 300 F. Supp. 1220 (E.D. Wis. 1969) rev'd on procedural grounds, 442 F.2d
29 (7th Cir. 1971).
122. Id. at 1224.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1226.
125. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.29 (1967).
126. 300 F. Supp. at 1233.
127. Id. at 1232.
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containing the facts supporting the court's decision was required by
due process.1 28
The tendency of courts, faced with the issue of bail, to avoid
the question and to modify the release procedures of the juvenile
court was also followed by the California Supreme Court in In re
M. 129  The minor, William M., was taken into custody for selling
marijuana to a police officer. The juvenile court judge conducting
the detention hearing declared that "anybody who sells marijuana or
LSD is detained here until his regular hearing, for the safety of
others." 130  Although the juvenile's counsel presented evidence to
prove that the minor would not present an imminent danger to him-
self or others, this evidence was rejected by the court.'' An addi-
tional suggestion that thd child be released to the responsibility of
his counsel acting as a probation officer was also rejected.' After
refusing to accept proof that detention could possibly be deleterious
to the boy and refusing to permit the boy or his parents to testify, the
court stated that it detained "as a matter of 'philosophy' or 'policy'
every child who was charged with the offense involved in the present
case."
133
When considering the bail issue presented in this case, the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court noted that the bail system could provide "un-
explored difficulties for most juveniles, particularly those who are in-
digent."'3 4 As a result, the court declined to deal with the constitu-
tional question and recognized that the California Juvenile Court
Law 85 provided an adequate substitute for bail if properly admin-
istered.'38  After noting that a juvenile has been granted the right to
remain silent and the right to confrontation by statute, the court con-
cluded that these sections clearly indicated the legislative intent that
to maintain a detention order, a prima facie case that the minor com-
mitted the offense must be presented.' 3 7  Furthermore, the court held
that when considering detention, the nature of the offense charged
could not be the sole rationale for detention, and "policies" for auto-
matic detention could not be established. 88
128. Id. at 1233.
129. 3 Cal. 3d 16, 473 P.2d 737, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970).
130. Id. at 20, 473 P.2d at 739, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 21, 473 P.2d at 740, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
134. Id. at 26, n.17, 473 P.2d at 744, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 40. The court cited Foote
IU, supra note 3.
135. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 500-966 (West 1961).
136. 3 Cal. 3d at 26, n.17, 473 P.2d at 744, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
137. Id. at 28, 473 P.2d at 745-46, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 41-42.
138. Id. at 31, 473 P.2d at 747, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
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The Alaska Supreme Court in Doe v. State30 considered the
practical problems of the contractual incapacity of the minor. The
Alaskan high court, like its California counterpart, recognized the
criticisms of the bail system and modified the existing means of re-
lease offered by the juvenile court. In the Doe case, a petition for a
declaration of delinquency was filed against the minor for selling
lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). At the detention hearing, the
court prepared to adjudicate the case pn the merits; as a result, a
continuance for preparation of the case was granted to the minor's
attorney. Because the hearing was on a Friday, to be continued on
the following Monday, the court inquired into the question of whether
the child should be detained over the weekend. The district attorney
stated that the defendant had threatened one of the witnesses and for
this reason requested that the minor be detained. 4 ' Doe's attorney
objected to this hearsay statement and declared that the minor had
never previously appeared before the court, and that there had been
no showing under the rule that detention was necessary. Nevertheless,
the order for detention was issued.:1
Doe's attorney appealed therefrom for a declaration that children
have a constitutional right to bail. The Alaska Supreme Court, after
recognizing the problems of the adult bail system and the additional
contractual problems of the minor, 4 ' declined to impose these prob-
lems on the minor. Such an imposition could only be detrimental
to the interests of the child. Instead, the court held that the child
had the right to remain free prior to adjudication when facts sup-
porting the juvenile petition would constitute a crime if committed by
an adult, and when the juvenile's appearance was reasonably as-
sured.14 3 Due process standards, the court declared, are required
at detention hearings because the child may lose his liberty. Such
being the case, due process required that the child have the right
to counsel at the detention inquiry,'4 that only competent, sworn testi-
mony be admitted,'45 and that facts supporting detention must be
specifically stated.' 46
The additional due process requirements espoused by these lower
courts maintained the informality and flexibility of the traditional
139. 487 P.2d 47, 49 (Alas. 1971).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 52.
143. Id. at 52-53.
144. Id. at 53. The court cited In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), and Baldwin v.
Lewis, 300 F. Supp. 1220 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
145. 487 P.2d at 53.
146. Id. The court cited In re G.M.B., 483 P.2d 1006 (Alas. 1971), and Baldwin
v. Lewis, 300 F. Supp. 1220 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
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juvenile court proceedings. The judges continued to have the dis-
cretion to grant release of the child or retain custody of the juvenile,
whichever was in the best interests of the individual. Due process
safeguards, however, were imposed by these courts at the detention
inquiry to avoid the arbitrary imposition of detention. Thus, these
court decisions resulted in an accommodation of the preadjudication
within the due process framework without imposing the problems
and additional complications of the criminal bail system, while con-
tinuing to maintain the concerns and flexibility of the juvenile court.
Conclusion
In light of the Supreme Court's mandate in McKeiver that the
beneficial aspects of the juvenile process be maintained, and that no
real benefits and only additional complications are contributed by the
right to bail, this right should not be imposed on the proceedings.
The informal preadjudication stage may be subject to abuse; evidence
supports the fact that the proceedings result in unnecessary detention
of juveniles and therefore do not satisfy fundamental fairness. The
right to bail, however, is not the appropriate means for obtaining
the child's release and remedying the abusive detention practices;
fundamental fairness of the juvenile proceedings will not be satisfied
by the imposition of the right to bail. Therefore, this right is not
constitutionally required in preadjudication proceedings. The bene-
fits of the informal juvenile proceeding outweigh the questionable
advantages offered by the right to bail, and more closely effectuate
the goals of the juvenile court system. These beneficial aspects have
been recognized by lower courts. The actions of these courts bring
the proceedings within the due process framework by modifying the
available means of release offered by the juvenile court so that funda-
mental fairness is satisfied. These decisions have imposed procedural
and evidentiary due process safeguards to insure release when at all
possible while permitting custody of the child only when consistent
with his welfare. In this manner the juvenile is not subject to the
practical deficiencies of the bail system, but rather, his best interests
and the goals of the juvenile system are more effectively served.
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